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Valuing  the Protection of Minimum Instream
Flows  in New  Mexico
Robert P. Berrens, Philip Ganderton, and Carol L.  Silva
Currently,  New Mexico law does not provide any legal avenue of protecting  instream
flows. A  change in the  status  quo requires  that a  prima facie  case be made-estab-
lishing sufficient  evidence  of the public  benefits from maintaining  instream  flows to
warrant  consideration,  or  standing,  in  future  water  policy  deliberations.  Using  the
contingent valuation  (CV) method,  we investigate the nonmarket benefits  of protect-
ing  minimum  instream  flows  in  New  Mexico.  Results  from  a  dichotomous  choice
CV telephone survey show significant nonmarket  values for protecting  instream flows
that are  sensitive  to a change  in  scope and  insensitive to  a group-size  reminder.
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Introduction
Western  states  differ  substantially  in  the  mechanisms  available  for protecting  instream
flows.  New  Mexico  (NM)  has  no  legal  avenue  for protecting  instream  flows  (Bokum,
Gabin,  and  Morgan)  and  has  been  historically  resistant  to  change  (DeYoung;  Nelson,
Horvack,  and Soloman).  A change  in the  status quo requires  that  a prima  facie  case be
made-establishing  sufficient evidence  of the public benefits  from maintaining instream
flows to  warrant consideration,  or standing,  in future  water policy  deliberations.  As one
piece  of empirical  evidence,  this study uses  the survey-based  contingent valuation  (CV)
method  to  estimate  nonmarket  values  for  protecting  minimum  instream  flows  in  NM
rivers.
In the case  of fully  appropriated  river systems,  maintaining  minimum instream  flows
is  often  in  conflict  with  long-standing  diversions  to  irrigated  agriculture  and  rapidly
growing  municipal  demands.  However,  across  the West,  there  is accumulating  evidence
on  the nonmarket  benefits  of protecting  instream  flows  (e.g.,  recreation,  water quality,
fish  and  wildlife  habitat,  biodiversity).  In New  Mexico,  minimum  instream  flows  and
associated  riparian  habitats  are  critical  to  the preservation  of a  number  of endangered
and at-risk  native fish  species.
The  CV method  is  a  valuable  tool  for measuring  the  economic  value  of nonmarket
environmental  goods  (Arrow  et  al.).  Continued  refinement  of CV  requires  formal  hy-
pothesis  testing  and  the  accumulation  of evidence  across  differing  survey  instruments
and  experimental  designs.  The  CV  telephone  survey  instrument  used  here  includes  a
dichotomous  choice  format:  respondents  accept  or reject  a  specified  payment  amount,
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which is varied across the sample, to a hypothetical trust fund used to buy or lease water
for protecting  instream  flows.
The prima facie case for the nonmarket benefits of instream flow protection is strength-
ened  if CV  survey  results  pass  some  minimum  tests  of validity.  To  provide  further
evidence,  we conduct  two split-sample  hypotheses  tests. First, we test for sensitivity  in
valuation responses to a change in the scope of the good. The specific scope test compares
values for protecting  minimum instream flows for a single endangered  fish in a  170-mile
river  stretch  versus  protecting  minimum  instream  flows  on four major  NM  rivers  with
eleven  threatened  and endangered  fish  species.'  Second,  we  test for sensitivity  in valu-
ation responses  to a brief reminder  on the  group-size  supporting the public  good.  Both
of these hypotheses  tests directly  address recent concerns over the validity of CV survey
results  (Green,  Kahneman, and  Kunreuther;  Kahneman  and  Knetsch).
Background  on Instream Flow  Protection and Values
Like all western states, NM water law is based on the prior appropriation doctrine. While
transferable,  prior appropriation  rights must be put to beneficial use, or the right can be
revoked.  New  Mexico  does  not  recognize  instream  flows  as  a beneficial  use  of water
and  provides  no  explicit  mechanism  for  their  protection  (DeYoung).  Instream  flow  is
water  in  its  natural channels  without diversion.  DeYoung  cites  long-standing  historical
arguments that NM water rights  system provides sufficient de facto protection of instream
flows.  Such  a  system  is  open to  abuse  and  is in  contrast to  accumulating  evidence  of
degraded  and  dewatered  riparian  ecosystems  (Bestgen  and  Platania;  Crawford  et  al.;
Rinne  and Platania).
Given that beneficial use requires that water be diverted from the streambed, voluntary
private market transfers  to provide instream  flows are unavailable  in  NM and  generally
restricted  in  most  western  states.2 In  the  other  prior  appropriation  states,  a  variety  of
alternative  protection  mechanisms  have  been  explored  (Bokum,  Gabin,  and  Morgan;
McNalley and Matthews),  including applications of the common law public trust doctrine
and explicit public interest clauses in state statutes. Further, in some states a single public
agency  may purchase  water rights to protect instream flows,  typically  restricted to some
minimum  requirement.
Although  not  specifically  directed  to  instream  flows,  NM  State  water  statutes  were
amended in  1985 so that all new appropriations  and transfers  of both ground- and surface
water are subject to public welfare considerations.  Protest of any appropriation  or transfer
is allowed for "legitimate"  public welfare concerns (Bokum, Gabin, and Morgan). Based
on this public  welfare clause, the state engineer could hypothetically  deny an application
that would  deplete  instream  flows required  for fish  or that  threatened  riparian  habitats.
'There  are  a  range of nesting and  sequencing  phenomena loosely  referred to  as  scope  effects,  or alternatively,  as  "part-
whole"  and  "embedding"  effects  (Brown  and Duffield).  Following  Carson  and  Mitchell's  categorization,  we  conduct  an
external  (split-sample)  scope test of component sensitivity  for geographically  nested  goods.  This corresponds  to Kahneman
and Knetsch's  concept  of perfect embedding.
2 Griffin  and  Hsu  derive  theoretical  conditions  for an  efficient  water market  that  accommodates  both  diversionary  and
instream interests.  Necessary  conditions  include  a  public  agency  for facilitating  transfers  and  recognizing  the presence  of
instream flow  interests  and full  identification  of return  flow coefficients  for all diversion  and  consumption  uses.  Achieving
efficiency  is  also complicated  by the  public good characteristics  (nonrivalness  and  nonexclusiveness)  of instream  flow pro-
tection  (Colby  1993).
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However,  the public  welfare  clause  is  ambiguous;  it has  rarely been  used,  remains  un-
defined  by either  courts or legislature,  and has not been previously  employed  to protect
instream  flows.3
There is  also a federal  presence  in the consideration  of NM instream  flow protection.
The  U.S. Forest Service  (USFS)  has  sought,  unsuccessfully,  to use the public trust doc-
trine  and  implied reserve  right arguments  to  obtain NM water rights  for instream flows
(Ranquist). 4 The U.S. Fish  and Wildlife  Service  (USFWS)  has  long  advocated  that  in-
stream  flows  should  be  recognized  in  NM  as  a  beneficial  use  of water  (e.g.,  Nelson,
Horvack,  and  Soloman).
Against this  backdrop,  in  August  1994  the  silvery  minnow  (Hybnognathus amarus)
was  listed  as  an endangered  species  by  the USFWS.  This  tiny fish  (approximately  31/2
inches  in  length)  was  once  abundant  throughout  the Rio  Grande  system but now  lives
in  5%  of  its  original  habitat-relegated  to  the  170  miles  composing  the  Middle  Rio
Grande.s  Maintaining  the  minnow's  habitat  depends  partly  on  instream  flows  (Bestgen
and Platania).  Low flow is a critical  threat  to the silvery minnow,  which is considered  a
bio-indicator  of the health  of warmwater riverine  ecosystems  in the Middle Rio Grande
(Crawford  et al.).  More  than  40%  of the  native  fish  species  of the  Middle  Rio  Grande
are either completely  or locally  extinct (Rinne and Platania).  The silvery minnow is one
of eleven  threatened  or  endangered  fish  species  in  New  Mexico  as  identified  by  the
USFWS  in  1994.
There  is a  need to  value the benefits  of instream flow protection.  Empirical  evidence
on such nonmarket benefits comes in a variety of forms. Loomis argues  that dollar values
for instream  flows  can  be  reasonably  estimated  using  nonmarket  techniques  and  often
compare  favorably  against the value of water in traditional beneficial uses. Colby (1990,
1993)  also finds  strong  economic  arguments  for providing  instream flows  that enhance
recreation  and  fish  and  wildlife  habitat.  Published  studies  on  recreational  use  values
associated with instream flows continue to accumulate (e.g., Duffield, Neher,  and Brown;
Harpman,  Sparling  and  Waddle;  Loomis  and  Creel;  Ward).  Both  Loomis  and  Colby
recognize  the importance  of both use and nonuse  values associated with instream flows.
Nonuse values may be  especially important for unique  environments or endangered  spe-
cies.
It  is  expected  that  the  nonmarket  values  investigated  in  this  study  will  be  mostly
composed  of nonuse  values.  Our focus  is on the protection of minimum instream flows
(not recreational  optimal  flows)  and endangered  and  threatened  fish  species  that are not
legally  or  preferentially  targeted  by  anglers.6 A nontrivial  portion  of the  sample  may
currently  recreate  (e.g., hiking  and birding)  in  riparian  areas  (e.g.,  the  "bosque"  of the
Middle  Rio  Grande),  and  the recovery  of riverine  ecosystems may  enhance  future  rec-
3  Gomez  cites the  NM state  engineer's  chief water  lawyer  as  questioning whether  public  welfare  can be quantified in  any
objective  manner,  and whether  social  factors  should  even be  considered.  For  counter perspectives  see Bokum,  Gabin,  and
Morgan and Dumars and  Minis.
4 In a key interpretation  of the implied reserved  right principle,  a  1978  Supreme Court ruling (U.S.  vs.  New Mexico,  438
U.S. 696)  determined that federal  agencies  cannot generally  appropriate water for instream flows, unless the state establishes
an instream flow  act or provision  (Ranquist).
5 The  Middle  Rio  Grande runs from  Cochiti  Dam  south  through  the greater  Albuquerque  area  and  on to Elephant  Butte
Dam.  Annual discharge is highest during the spring runoff between March and June and  lowest from July to November when
irrigation  and municipal demands  peak.  In  low flow years,  portions  of the mainstem  of the Middle Rio Grande will run dry
for extensive  periods.
6 The  silvery  minnow  is not  directly  pursued  by  sport anglers  but rather is  preyed  on  by larger  fish  and other  birds  and
river  mammals  (e.g.,  heron  and  otters).  As  a  warmwater  species  it  is  generally  not  found  in  the  same  aquatic  habitats  as
preferred  target  species  such as  trout  (Crawford et  al.;  Rinne  and  Platania).
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reational  opportunities  (including angling).  However,  we make no attempt to decompose
total value estimates,  which  may in part reflect current  or expected future  use.
Theoretical Considerations
The household's maximum willingness to pay  (WTP) to protect minimum instream flows
can be  defined  as  the  Hicksian  compensating  variation  (HCV)  measure  of the  welfare
change:
(1)  WTPHCV  =  e(p,  Q1,  Uo)  - e(p,  QO,  UO),
where  e(.)  is  the  household's  expenditure  function,  p  is  a  vector  of prices  for market
goods, Q is the level of instream flow protection,  and U is the level of utility. A minimum
protection  level for instream  flows  is represented  by  Q1, against  an initial  lack of pro-
tection,  Q°. Thus,  WTPHCV  is an income  adjustment that represents  the household's max-
imum  willingness  to pay  to  acquire  the  change  in  instream  flow protection  from Q° to
Q1 (Q1> Q0),  while  maintaining  utility  at the  initial  level,  U°. It also  implies  that the
property  right  is  not  currently  held  by those  valuing  instream  flows,  as  is  the  case  in
New  Mexico.
In  the  specific  case  of minimum  instream  flows,  the  protection  outcome  Q 1 can be
thought  of  as  a vector  of geographic  locations  (different  rivers  or  river  stretches)  or
components  q1,  Q1 =  {q1,  . .,  q1}.  As  a  theoretical  condition,  imposing  weak mono-
tonicity  on  the  valuation  of  any  single  geographic  component  (e.g.,  the  Middle  Rio
Grande) relative to  any larger  set, or in this  case,  the full  set of major rivers  implies
(2)  WTPHCV(qj) 
- WTPHCV(QI).
Strong monotonicity implies  the strict inequality and is a testable hypothesis (Carson and
Mitchell);  it provides the basis  for the  test of scope investigated  here.
Considerable  discussion  has centered  around  several CV  studies  that have  shown in-
sensitivity  to changes  in the scope of the good  (e.g.,  Kahneman  and Knetsch). However,
it is unclear what was tested in  some cases,  and whether  the results were  simply  anom-
alies (Carson and Mitchell; Smith). In a series of recent papers, Kahneman and colleagues
argue  that  there  are  two  competing  models  of how  individuals  answer  valuation  ques-
tions: the purchase  model and the contribution  model (e.g., Green,  Kahneman,  and Kun-
reuther;  Kahneman  and Ritov).
In  the  purchase  model,  willingness-to-pay  (or be  paid)  responses  are interpreted  as
valid measures of welfare change for given changes in a public good. In the contribution
model,  individuals  view public  goods  as  good  causes  that need  support,  where willing-
ness-to-pay responses  express only a general attitude and entail low sensitivity to changes
in  scope  (Kahneman  and Ritov).  Further,  Green,  Kahneman,  and  Kunreuther argue  that
the purchase  model  should be invariant to  a reminder  of the number of potentially  con-
tributing  households,  whereas  the  contribution  model posits  that  such  a reminder  may
be  influential.  In the  initial  test  of this  hypothesis,  Green,  Kahneman,  and  Kunreuther
identify  highly  significant  reminder  effects  that  lowered  valuations  for  several  public
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Table  1.  Disposition  Table for the February 1995 Quarterly Profile Telephone  Survey
Long
Local  Distance  Total
Completed interviews  357  369  726a
Failure  to contact  (e.g., no  answers,  busy, and exceeded  ten tries)b  224  184  398
Appointments  not completed  58  43  101
Refusals  169  141  310
Language  barriers  14  21  35
a Includes  28  pretest respondents  not  included  in the  survey data  set of 698  observations  but used  by
the  CATI system in tracking response  rates.
b Includes  some  call backs discontinued  before the ten-try limit when the  target number of surveys was
reached.
goods  by  50%  or  more. 7 This  result  has  not  been  investigated  elsewhere  and  thus  is
tested  here, jointly with  the test of scope.
Survey Instrument and Experimental Design
The CV survey  was part of a regular  quarterly profile telephone survey of New Mexico.
The instrument  was  administered  in  February  1995  by the  Institute  for Public  Policy
(IPP)  at  the  University  of New  Mexico.  The  quarterly  profile  is  an  omnibus  survey
conducted quarterly  since  1988.  The statewide survey uses  a stratified random  sampling
approach.  Proportionate  sampling  is  used  within  the  working  ranges  of all  telephone
number prefixes  in NM to obtain a minimum target of 500 completed  interviews,  which
provides a 4%  margin of error at  a 95%  confidence  level. For the February  1995 survey
there  was  an  oversample  of  170  completed  interviews  for  Bemalillo  County  (greater
Albuquerque).  Complete  description  of response  rates  and  disposition  of all  numbers
called  are provided  in  table  1. The  contact  rate  was  75%  (completed  +  appointments
not completed  +  refusals  +  language  barriers  / total  numbers  dialed);  the  cooperation
rate  was  64%  (completed  /  completed  +  appointments  not  completed  +  refusals);  and
the refusal  rate was  30%  (refusal /  completed  +  refusals).  Completed  surveys averaged
28  minutes.  The  survey  included  attitudinal  questions  on  topics  about NM  institutions
and  politics,  as well  as  numerous  socioeconomic  indicators.
The  valuation  section  was  pretested  and  refined  through  several  iterations;  the  final
version  is presented  in the  appendix.8 It begins  by asking  general  awareness  questions
on  NM  water  issues.  The  survey  text  defines  beneficial  use  and  instream  flows  and
identifies  some of the benefits (e.g., fish  and wildlife, recreation,  water quality) and costs
7  This negative response effect,  using an open-ended valuation question and personal interviews,  was found when describing
both  one  and  ten million  potentially  contributing  households  and  across  alternative  payment  vehicles  (taxes  and  voluntary
contributions).  It is  not  interpreted  by  Green,  Kahneman,  and Kunreuther  as  evidence  of increased free-riding  but rather of
the increased  salience of social  norms,  such as the acceptable  level  of contribution for  a member of the collective.  Our focus
here  is  not on disentangling  potential  causes  but rather on  empirically  investigating  whether  the effect can  be replicated  in
a dichotomous choice  CV  telephone  survey setting.
8  This  included  two focus groups  who completed written  versions of the valuation section and  participated  in a debriefing.
Then,  the IPP interviewers  participated  in a reading and discussion of the survey.  Finally, each interviewer completed several
telephone pretests  of the survey instrument  (appendix).
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(e.g.,  higher prices,  restricted  development)  of protecting  instream  flows.  Respondents
are then told of the number  (eleven)  of endangered  and  threatened fish  species  in NM
and  the  four  separate  rivers  (Gila,  Pecos,  Rio  Grande,  and  San Juan)  where  they  are
found.  The  text  of  a  split-sample  treatment  includes  a  brief  statement  identifying  the
silvery  minnow of the Middle Rio  Grande  as one  of the eleven fish  species. All respon-
dents  are  told  that protecting  endangered  fish  and  their habitat  may  require  protectiang
minimum  iniistream  flows,  and  that  trust funds  are  used in  some  states  to  buy  or lease
water for  such  purposes.  Prior to  the  valuation  section, respondents  are  told that  they
will be asked  about the dollar value  their household  places  on protecting instream flows
and that there are no right or wrong  answers; then they are reminded of household budget
constraints  and  available  substitutes.
Using the CATI (computer-assisted  telephone interviewing)  system, the valuation sec-
tion employs  a  2  X 2 experimental  design  for split-sample  hypothesis testing.  The two
specific  hypotheses  to be tested  are:  (a) sensitivity to  a change  in the scope of the good
and  (b) sensitivity to a reminder on the group size  (500,000 NM households) potentially
contributing  to the provision  of the public  good. For modeling,  scope is hereafter  indi-
cated  by the  dummy  variable,  SM,  where  SM  =  1 indicates  the  treatment  sample that
received the silvery minnow valuation question,  and SM =  0 indicates the control sample
that received  the general instream flow question.  The split-sample treatment for the group
size reminder directly  preceded the valuation question  and was written to closely follow
that used in  Green, Kahneman,  and Kunreuther.  For modeling, the presence  of the group
size reminder is hereafter indicated by the dummy variable, RM,  where RM = 1 indicates
the reminder treatment,  and RM  = 0 indicates  no reminder.
The hypothetical market describes  a special trust fund used to buy or lease water from
willing  parties for the purpose  of maintaining  minimum  instream flows.  The trust fund
was  chosen  because  it  is  actually  used  to  protect  instream  flows  in  some  states  (e.g.,
Montana).  The voluntary  contribution  format is  commonly  used in CV  studies  of non-
exclusive  environmental  goods,  including  the protection  of instream flows  (Duffield and
Patterson;  Brown  and  Duffield).  Respondents  are  asked  their willingness  to  contribute
A($) annually  for each of five years to protect minimum instream flows. The dichotomous
choice  valuation  question  for  the  treatment  group  (SM  =  1)  is  modified  to  identify
minimum  instream  flows  to  specifically  protect  the  silvery  minnow  in  the  Middle  Rio
Grande.  As  shown  in  the  appendix,  half  of this  treatment  sample  is  crossed  with  the
treatment for the  group size  reminder (RM  =  1).
An  important  element  of the  experimental  design  in  dichotomous  choice  CV is  the
number  and  size  of the  offered  payment  amounts,  A($),  that  are  allocated  across  the
sample.  A  large  literature  has  developed  around  this  topic,  and  no  consensus  has
emerged.  The  pragmatic  approach used here  was  to iteratively  select  nine separate  pay-
ment amounts to be allocated  across the expected sample of 670 completed surveys. The
CATI  system permits  the daily monitoring  of acceptance  rates  and  allows  selected pay-
ment  amounts  to  be  iteratively  updated.  Based  on the  pretest  results,  a  single  initial
payment  amount  ($20)  was  selected  and  the  observed  probability  of acceptance  calcu-
lated  for  the  first  50  observations.  Then,  alternative  payment  amounts  were  selected
several  at  a  time  and  randomly  allocated  by the  CATI  system,  with  some  final  sample
filling  using  payment  amounts  falling  in  the  midrange  of  the  observed  probability  of
acceptance  distribution.  This follows  the Kanninen  suggestion of keeping excess weight
out of the upper and lower  15  percentiles.  The  final set of payment  amounts, A($)= {5,
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Table 2.  Acceptance  Rates  by Payment Amount and Experimental  Treatment
Payment  SM= 1 and  SM= 1 and  SM=O and  SM=O and
A($)  RM= 1  RM=O  RM= 1  RM=0  Totals
5  16/25  12/21  9/14  16/23  53/83
(0.64)1]  (0.57)  (0.64)
[ 2 1  (0.70)  (0.64)131
20  18/21  12/17  18/21  9/19  57/78
(0.86)  (0.71)[3]  (0.86)  (0.47)1]l (0.73)
[41
30  6/24  9/28  13/29  12/16  40/97
(0.25)[
1 ]  (0.32)[1  (0.45)  (0.75)
[1 1 (0.41)[31
40  7/18  6/17  8/19  15/21  36/75
(0.39)[2]  (0.35)[11  (0.42)[1]  (0.71)[11  (0.48)5]
50  4/13  9/25  8/17  6/19  27/74
'(0.31)
11 (0.36)[1]  (0.47)[2]  (0.32)[21  (0.37)[61
75  10/26  9/12  8/19  9/21  36/78
(0.39)  (0.75)  (0.42)  (0.43)[2]  (0.46)[2]
100  6/17  3/20  10/26  5/19  24/82
(0.35)  (0.15)[1]  (0.39)  (0.26)
[2 ]  (0.29)r31
150  1/9  3/18  10/14  8/20  22/61
(0.11)  (0.17)[']  (0.71)  (0.40)1]  (0.36)[2]
200  2/9  1/10  1/8  1/13  5/40
(0.22)  (0.10)[1]  (0.13)  (0.08)[1]  (0.13)[21
Totals  70/162  64/168  85/167  81/171  300/668
(0.43) [51 (0.38) [ 91 (0.51)[51  (0.47)[11]  (0.45)[301
Notes: Numbers in parentheses  are percentage rates.  Bracketed numbers in selected cells give the number
of  unusable  responses  or  failures  to  answer  the  valuation  question  and  are  not  used  in  calculating
acceptance  rates.
20,  30,  40,  50,  75,  100,  150,  200},  was  also  coordinated  with  the  2  X  2 experimental
design.  Table 2 shows the observed acceptance  rates to the dichotomous choice valuation
question  broken down by elements  of the experimental  design.
Model  Specification  and Empirical Results
Before  discussing  the  estimation  of conditional  WTP  functions,  we  report  the  results
from  nonparametric  tests  of  scope  and reminder  effects  using  the observed  acceptance
rates  shown  in  table  2.  Wilcoxson  signed-rank  tests  for paired  difference  experiments
were  conducted  with pairings  at each payment  level, A($),  forming  the  probability  dis-
tributions  (McLave  and  Deitrich).  For  the test  of scope  (SM  =  1 versus  SM  = 0),  the
evidence  rejects  the  null hypothesis  that the  probability  distributions  are identical  (at  a
less  than 0.02 significance  level for the two-tailed test,  and  0.01 for the one-tailed test).
Thus,  there  is  initial  evidence  of sensitivity  to  a change  in  scope.  For  the  test  of the
reminder effect  (RM =  1 versus RM = 0), the evidence supports the null hypothesis that
the  probability  distributions  are  the  same.  These  tests  do  not  control  for  respondent
characteristics,  and we turn  to conditional  WTP models.
In practice,  WTP  is  a  stochastic  variable  and  may  be  conditioned  on  a  number  of
determinants.  Descriptive statistics  with response  rates  for selected  variables  are  shown
in table  3, which  also includes  the expected relation to WTP.  In the dichotomous  choice
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Table 3.  Descriptive  Statistics for Selected  Variables
Useable  Expected
Stand.  Re-  Relation
Variable  Description  Mean  Error  sponses  to  WTP
AGE  Age  in years.
IMPORT  Importance  of instream flows:  scale  0-10,
0 =  not important  at all,  10  =  extremely
important.
RECOG  Believe  instream  flows  should be recognized
as beneficial  use:  1  =  yes,  0  =  no.
ENV-ORG  Environmental  organization  member:  1 =  yes,
0  =  no.
BERN-CO  Bernalillo  Country resident:  1 =  yes,  0 =  no.
FISH-LIC  Own fishing  license:  1 =  yes, 0  =  no.
POL-IDEO  Political ideology:  scale  1-7,  1 =  strongly
liberal,  7  =  strongly  conservative.
INC  Household  income,  categories  1-9 in $1,000s:
1  =  (<$10);  2  =  ($10-20);  3  =  ($20-30);
4  =  ($30-40);  5  =  ($40-50);  6  =  ($50-60);
7  =  ($60-70);  8  =  ($70-80);  9  = (-$80).
INC1  Income categories  1-3.
INC2  Income categories  4 and  5.
INC3  Income categories  6-9.
AWARE  Aware  of New  Mexico  fish species  on  endan-
gered  list:  1  =  yes,  0  = no.
RM  Treatment  for test of sensitivity  to reminder  of
group  size:  1 =  received  reminder,  0  =  did
not receive reminder.
SM  Treatment  for test of sensitivity to  scope  of
the  good;  1 =  instream flows  for silvery
minnow,  0  =  instream flows for major NM
rivers.
INTERACT  Interaction  term: SM*RM.
43.52  15.61  687  ?
8.16  2.10  689  +
0.85  0.36  657  +
0.13  0.33  689  +
0.45  0.50  696  ?
0.43  0.50  692  +
4.38  1.54  680

















0.49  0.50  698  ?
0.49  0.50  698  ?
0.24  0.43  698  ?
Note:  The  sample  size was  698.
elicitation format, WTP is also an unobservable  variable and must be statistically inferred
from  the  yes  and  no  responses  to  the  payment  amount,  A,  which  is  varied  across  the
sample.  We follow  Cameron's  censored  logistic  approach  to  directly estimate  the  WTP
function:
(3) WTP,  =  1'X  +  ei,
where X is a vector of explanatory variables including the treatment indicators (RM,  SM),
f,  is  a  vector  of coefficients  to  be  estimated,  and  ei  is  an  error  term  assumed  to  be
distributed logistically  with mean 0  and standard deviation  b.  The logistic distribution  is
further  characterized  by the  additional  scale parameter  K,  where  K  =  (bV3)/1r. For the
sample  of individual  observations  the  simplified log-likelihood  for the censored  logistic
approach  is
(4)  log L  =  E  (1  - W)  [(Ai  - 3'Xi)/K]  - log[l  +  exp[(A,  - 8'Xi)/K]],
where  Wi  is  a  binary  indicator  of a  yes  (=1)  or  no  (=0)  response  to  the  valuation
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Table 4.  Estimation Results  for WTP  Models
WTP-4 (Joint Model)
































































Log-likelihood  -332.58  -334.11
LR test (X 2)  112.16***  109.10***
(df = 14)  (df= 9)

















































94.41***  98.90***  74.03***  117.15***
(5.86)  (5.68)  (4.14)  (3.43)
-339.31  -331.34
98.70***  114.64***
(df= 8)  (df= 16)
0.127  0.148
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses  are asymptotic t-statistics;  one,  two, and  three asterisks indicate  signif-
icance  at the  0.10,  0.05,  and 0.01  levels,  respectively.  The  sample  was  561.
question.  Using  (4)  and  the  nonlinear  optimization  procedures  in  SHAZAM  (White  et
al.), maximum likelihood estimates  of /3, K, and their  standard errors  are obtained.
Table  4  presents  the  results  of estimating  four  separate  WTP  models.  WTP-1  is  an
extended  model  with  15 explanatory  variables,  and the  payment amount, A.  WTP-2  is a
more parsimonious  model that tests for the effect  of deleting  five insignificant  explana-
tory  variables.  Comparing  the first two  specifications,  there  is little to  separate them in
terms  of overall  goodness-of-fit  statistics.  The  evidence  from  separate  likelihood  ratio
(LR)  tests rejects the null hypothesis that all  model coefficients  are  zero and  shows that
each model  is highly  significant at the 0.01 level.  Each model has a  McFadden R2 value
of 0.14.
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The  signs of significant variables  are  stable  across  WTP-1  and  WTP-2. In each model
the estimated coefficient  on the scale parameter,  K,  is positive  and significant  at the 0.01
level,  indicating  that  the  probability  of acceptance  is  inversely  related  to  the  payment
amount,  A  (Cameron).  Estimated  coefficients  on the  income-category  dummies  (INC2,
INC3) are positive  and  significant  at  less than the 0.05  level. Estimated  coefficients  on
age (AGE) and an index of self-reported political  ideology (POL-IDEO) are negative and
significant  at  the  0.05  level.  Younger  and  more  liberal  respondents  are  more  likely  to
contribute  a  given amount.  Additionally,  the  estimated  coefficients  for an index of per-
ceived importance  of protecting  instream  flows  (IMPORT) and a binary  indicator  (RE-
COG) of whether individuals  feel instream flows should be legally  recognized as  a ben-
eficial use  are positive  and  significant  at the 0.01  level.
The  tests  of  scope  and  group-size  reminder  are  conducted  within  the  WTP  models
using the  estimated  coefficients  on  the treatment indicators  SM and RM.  The estimated
coefficient on RM is insignificant;  the evidence supports the null hypothesis of no group-
size reminder  effect  (Ho 0:  RM  =  0,  versus  Ha:P8RM  0). Further,  the estimated  coefficient
on SM is negative  and significant  at the 0.01  level;  the evidence supports the alternative
hypothesis  of sensitivity  to  a change in the  scope of instream flow  protection  (Ho:/3,M  =
0, versus  Ha:  3M = 0). We reject the null hypothesis that  WTP is insensitive  to a change
in  scope. Moreover,  the negative sign supports, within a one-tailed test, the monotonicity
hypothesis  that the  value of minimum  instream  flows in  all major  NM rivers  is greater
than the value  of minimum instream flows  to protect the  silvery minnow  in the Middle
Rio Grande.  Together,  these two tests provide evidence  contrary to the contribution model.
Relative  to  WTP-2,  additional  variables  in  WTP-1  include  an  interaction  term  (IN-
TERACT) between the dummy variables  testing  sensitivity  to scope (SM) and the group-
size reminder  effect  (RM) and  binary indicators  for  awareness  of the  endangered  status
of the protected fish in each sample treatment (AWARE),  membership in an environmental
organization  (ENV-ORG),  current  or recent  ownership of a NM  fishing  license by  any
household  member (FISH-LIC), and residential  status in Bernalillo County (BERN-CO),
which  includes  the primary  urban  area of Albuquerque.  The  model estimates  show that
the coefficients  on all  five additional explanatory  variables  are not significantly different
from  zero.  The evidence  from  an  LR  test  using  WTP-1  as  the  unrestricted  model  and
WTP-2 as  the restricted  model  supports  the  null hypothesis  of no  significant difference
between models.
Specification  WTP-4  is  a joint  model  that  allows  the  parameters  on  each  explanatory
variable to differ across  the scope treatment (SM) and tests for the consistency of the insig-
nificant reminder effect (RM). The model WTP-3 represents the extreme restriction that there
is no  SM treatment and provides  a reference  for the joint model WTP-4. It also  shows that
the  signs  and  significance  of  all  other  variables  are  maintained  when  the  significant  SM
dummy  is  dropped.  Using the joint model  WTP-4, the evidence  from  an LR  test  supports
the alternative hypothesis  of a significant difference  (at the 0.10 level) between  the separate
vectors of coefficients  for the  two SM treatments  (H0: /|1=  1  =  3ISM= 0, versus Ha:I3ls= I  1
PISM = 0).
The joint model,  WTP-4,  fits  separate  WTP functions  for each  SM  treatment  group,
allowing  all  coefficients  to  differ across  the  scope  of the  good  being valued.  This is  in
contrast to  assuming that the SM treatment simply results in a shift of the WTP function
(e.g., WTP-2). Allowing the two sets of coefficients  to vary shows changes in significance
for several  variables  and demonstrates  a larger  dispersion (implicit  in the estimated  co-
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efficients  on  K)  for the broader  composite  good.  Conditional  WTP  for general  instream
flow protection  on all major rivers (SM = 0) shows significant income  effects at the 0.01
level,  while  age  and  political  ideology  are insignificant.  Conditional  WTP  for instream
flow protection  for the  silvery  minnow  (SM  =  1)  shows  reduced income  effects, while
older and more conservative  respondents are significantly less willing to contribute. How-
ever,  in  both  SM treatment  groups  the  estimated  coefficient  for the  RM dummy  is  not
significantly  different from zero. 9
In summary,  across the nonparametric  tests and WTP specifications  there is significant
sensitivity  in  valuation  responses  to  a  change  in the  scope  of instream  flow protection.
The direction of this  sensitivity satisfies  the monotonicity  hypothesis. Further,  estimating
a joint  WTP  model  shows  considerable  differences  in  the  two  sets  of coefficients,  in-
cluding increased  dispersion with the increase  in scope.  Finally,  there is no evidence of
any response  effect  due to  a group-size  reminder;  this holds  across  two different  levels
of instream flow protection.
Estimation and Discussion  of Valuation  Results
Using specification  WTP-2 and the sample means for all variables,  except SM,  we obtain
the function,  $WTP  =  82.28  - 57.10(SM).  Using the joint model specification  WTP-4,
mean predicted  annual household willingness to pay for protection  of minimum instream
flows  for  the  silvery  minnow  on  the  Middle  Rio  Grande  is  $28.73  (standard  error  of
$3.76, N = 284), with 71%  of the predicted values positive. In contrast,  also using WTP-
4,  the  mean  value  is  $89.68  (standard  error  of $5.91,  N  =  277)  for the  protection  of
minimum  instream  flows  on  all  major  NM  rivers,  with  85%  of the  predicted  values
positive.
The value for minimum instream flows increases for the single change in geographical
scope of NM  river protection by approximately  200%  ($29 to  $90).  However,  the  170-
mile  Middle  Rio  Grande  is  only  a  small fraction  of the  1,000  plus miles  for all  major
NM  rivers. Further,  the  silvery minnow  was  identified  as  only one of eleven threatened
and endangered  fish species found in four rivers. Thus, while split samples were sensitive
to  the  change  in  scope,  estimated  values  were  not linearly  additive  in  the  number  of
rivers  (or fish  species).  Similarly,  Brown  and  Duffield  find diminishing  marginal  WTP
for instream  flow protection  as the number of Montana rivers  increases,  which they cite
as  evidence of imperfect  substitution.
Further context  for the household  WTP estimates  of $29  and $90  can be provided by
comparisons  with other  CV studies, where  a variety of both higher and lower  estimates
can be found.  In the Brown and Duffield study of Montana instream flow protection, not
involving  endangered  fish  species,  a dichotomous  choice  format  was  combined  with  a
trust fund payment vehicle  and a mail  survey  sample.  They report values in the $3-$23
range  (in  1994  dollars),  depending  on  the  segment  of  population  (nonuser/user)  and
number of rivers protected.  In an open-ended  CV with a mail survey of an Albuquerque
NM  sample,  Cummings,  Ganderton,  and McGuckin  find  an annual  household  value  of
$10  (in 1994  dollars) for protecting  the threatened  Colorado squawfish, which decreased
9 While not  presented here,  an additional joint model was  estimated that incorporated the restriction  that the coefficient  on
the reminder (RM)  is  the same for both SM treatment  groups. Evidence  from  an LR  test shows no  significant difference  with
specification  WTP-4.
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when  valued  as  part of  a  package  of public  goods.  The  Colorado  squawfish  occurs  in
the San Juan River in northern NM and is one of the eleven species  referenced generally
in  this  study.  The  described  recovery  program  included  a  hypothetical  purchasing  of
water  rights.  In  a review  of previous  nonuse  value  studies  of western  instream  flows,
Colby (1993)  cites a range of annual household values from $40 to $80.10 Sanders, Walsh,
and McKean  use mail survey results and an open-ended elicitation format with a  special
fund  for  valuing  the  protection  of eleven  selected  wild  and  scenic  rivers  in  Colorado.
They report an estimate of $141  per household  annually  (in 1994 dollars). Finally, in the
only test of real versus hypothetical  contributions to an instream flow trust fund, Duffield
and Patterson find  evidence  that hypothetical  contributions  may  overestimate  relative to
actual contributions  (ranging from  33%  to  100%  for different  groups). The mail survey
sample was  drawn  from  licensed  anglers  using Montana  rivers  and  had  a low  response
rate.
Conclusions
The primary  objective  of this study was  to establish  the prima facie case for nonmarket
benefits associated  with protecting  minimum instream flows.  Such evidence is important
in helping  to  determine  whether  instream  flow concerns  warrant consideration,  or even
have legitimate  standing  in future deliberations  over water resources  management  (e.g.,
determining  beneficial  use or public  welfare).
A carefully administered  telephone survey  shows that NM households value minimum
instream  flows.  Further,  confidence  in  the  values  estimated  here  is  increased  by  their
sensitivity  to  a  change in  scope  and  insensitivity  to  a reminder  of group size,  evidence
against  the contribution  model of valuation  responses.
With the right  impetus, the prior appropriation  doctrine has been responsive elsewhere
in  the  West  to  changing  public preferences.  Economists  and  other  social  scientists  can
continue  to  contribute  to this  research by investigating  the relative  merits of alternative
mechanisms  for  instream  flow  protection  (e.g.,  water  markets  or public  welfare  inter-
vention).  Prudence  and pragmatism require  that such  analyses be done in the context  of
potentially  irreversible losses  of native  fish species.
[Received October 1995; final version received May 1996.]
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Appendix:  Telephone  Survey  Description and Selected  Text
This  appendix  provides  the  text  for the  instream  flow portion  of the  February  1995
quarterly  profile.  For  brevity,  the  text  for  coding  answers  is  not  provided.  All  ques-
tion/answer  codes included a Don't Know/No Answer (DK/NA) option. Each respondent
was  taken  through  a  set of common text  and  questions,  renumbered  below  as  Q1-Q5.
To  implement  the 2  X  2  split  sample  treatments,  the  CATI  system then  directs  survey
observations  through  four possible paths  for the contingent  scenario and valuation ques-
tions  (Q6-Q  1).
1.  Q6,  Q7,  Q8  (corresponds  to SM  = 1, RM  =  1 in table  1)
2.  Q6,  Q8  (corresponds  to SM  = 1, RM  = 0  in table  1)
3.  Q9,  Q10, Qll  (corresponds  to SM  = 0, RM  =  1 in table  1)
4.  Q9, Qll  (corresponds  to SM  = 0, RM  = 0  in table  1)
There were also several follow-up questions (e.g., open-ended WTP) to each dichotomous
choice  valuation question  that are  not replicated  here.
Q1.  The next  series  of questions  concern  water  quality  and  water  quantity  in  New
Mexico.  There are many competing demands for water found underground and in rivers,
lakes,  and streams. These demands come from cities households, agriculture and industry.
How important do you think water issues  are in New Mexico?  Using a scale where zero
is  not at all important,  ten is extremely  important,  and  you may  choose  any number in
between,  please  tell me how  important you consider water issues  in New Mexico?
Q2.  Under New Mexico  water law,  water must be put to a beneficial use  or the right
to  the water may be  lost. Traditionally,  beneficial  uses  include  irrigated  agriculture,  in-
dustry,  and  cities.  Another  possible  use of water  is  to  leave  it  in  rivers  and  streams.
Instream flow is a measure of the water in rivers and  streams. Protecting instream flows
ensures  a  certain  amount  of water  flowing  in  rivers  and  remaining  in  lakes.  How  im-
portant  do you  think it  is to  maintain  minimum  instream  flows  in the  major  rivers  of
New Mexico?  Using a scale where zero is not at all important, ten is extremely important,
and  you may choose  any  number in between,  please tell me how important you think it
is to  maintain minimum instream flows  in the major rivers  of New Mexico?
Q3.  Instream  flows  support  fish  and  wildlife,  vegetation  and  habitat,  recreation  and
viewing opportunities.  Minimum instream flows can also protect water quality by diluting
pollution.  Maintaining  instream  flows may prevent costly  federal  government  actions to
protect endangered species  and water quality.  At present New Mexico does not recognize
instream  flows  as  a beneficial  use  of water.  If New Mexico  were  to recognize  instream
flows  as  a beneficial use, private individuals  and groups,  and government agencies  could
buy  or lease water to  be left in  rivers  and  streams. It is possible  that the price of some
agricultural  commodities  and  municipal  water rates  could  increase,  and  some  develop-
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ment could be restricted.  Do you  think that instream flows should be legally recognized
as  a  beneficial  use of water?
Q4.  In  some  states,  government  agencies  such  as  Fish  and  Wildlife  or  Parks  and
Recreation  can buy or lease water from willing parties  in order to protect instream flows
during low flow years.  Would you vote yes or no to allow  a state agency to buy or lease
water from willing  parties in order  to protect instream  flows?
Q5.  There  are  currently  six  fish  species  listed  as  endangered  in New  Mexico,  with
another  five  fish  species  listed  as  threatened.  Were  you previously  aware  that  any New
Mexico  fish species  had been listed  as  endangered  or threatened?
Q6.  By  federal  law  the critical  habitat of endangered  fish  species  must be protected,
and this may require  maintaining minimum instream flows.  In New Mexico,  endangered
fish  species  are  found  in  a  number  of the major  rivers  including  the  Gila,  Pecos,  Rio
Grande,  and  the San Juan.  The silvery  minnow is  a small  fish found  in the Middle Rio
Grande  and is currently  listed  as  an endangered  species.
Now  I  would like to ask you several  questions  about the dollar value  your household
puts  on protecting  minimum instream  flows  specifically  to protect  the  silvery  minnow.
There  are  no right  or wrong  answers.  Before  answering,  remember  your household  in-
come  and budget,  and decide  what you  could realistically  afford.  Money  spent  on pro-
tecting instream flows  is money not available  for other goods, public programs, or other
environmental  programs.  The establishment of a  special trust fund for buying or leasing
water is used in some  states  to protect fish  species.
Q7. If a special  trust fund was  set up in New Mexico,  and requests  were  made state-
wide, up to half a million households could contribute.  So,  each dollar of average house-
hold contribution  produces  a half a  million dollars for the special  trust fund.
Q8. Would your household  contribute A  dollars  each  year for five  years  to  a special
trust fund used to buy or lease  water from willing parties to maintain minimum instream
flows for the silvery  minnow  in the Middle Rio  Grande?
Q9. By  federal  law the  critical  habitat of endangered  fish species  must be protected,
and this may  require maintaining  minimum instream flows.  In New Mexico, endangered
fish  species  are  found  in  a  number  of the  major  rivers  including  the  Gila,  Pecos,  Rio
Grande,  and the  San Juan.
Now  I would like to  ask you several questions  about the dollar value your household
puts on protecting minimum instream flows. There are no right or wrong answers.  Before
answering,  remember  your household  income  and  budget  and  decide  what  you  could
realistically afford.  Money  spent on protecting  instream flows  is money not available for
other goods,  public  programs,  or other environmental  programs.  The establishment of a
special trust fund for buying or leasing water is used in some states to protect fish species.
Q10.  If  a  special  trust  fund  was  set  up  in  New  Mexico,  and  requests  were  made
statewide,  up to  half a million  households  could contribute.  So,  each  dollar  of average
household  contribution  produces  a half a million  dollars for the special  trust fund.
Qll. Would your household  contribute A  dollars each year for five years  to a special
trust fund used to buy or lease water from willing parties to maintain  minimum instream
flows  in the major rivers  of New Mexico?
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